



Americans are polarized about partisan loyalty and policy, but
there is little animosity between cultural and social groups.
Many commentators have expressed fears of a “culture war” between Liberals and Conservatives
which appears to have arisen alongside the increase in partisan polarization. But is this increased
partisanship fuelled by greater animosity between social groups such as gender, class, age, and
religion? In new research which looks at people’s attitudes towards other social groups and their
partisanship over the past half century, Christopher Muste finds that social differences on policy
issues do not extend to a direct animosity towards other groups which could otherwise reinforce
issue-based and partisan polarization.
Recent years have seen an increasingly heated debate about polarization and “culture wars” in America. This
debate has been plagued by confusion, reflecting the multiple definitions and measures of these concepts that
produce often apparently contradictory research findings among academics.  Often, the ideas of polarization and
culture war are used interchangeably; more typically, culture is defined in terms of one or more values (such as
traditionalism) or value-laden social issues (such as abortion), and polarization is defined as partisan, ideological
or issue differences.  The resulting cacophony of research findings hampers our ability to assess the depth,
breadth, and trends in polarization.
In new research, I address this confusion by developing alternative measures of cultural polarization rooted in
social science research on social groups and emotions. I analyzed two measures of polarization: social group
members’ basic emotions, also called affect, toward their own social in-groups and their opposite out-groups, and
the correlations between those group emotions and people’s partisanship.  I find that in general,  in contrast to the
policy divisions between social groups observed in prior research there is no direct animosity towards those of
other groups, meaning that process of partisan ‘sorting’ along ideological lines has not extended to the social
foundations of politics.
To measure emotions, I used the ANES feeling thermometer, which assesses respondents’ positive (warm) or
negative (cool) affect toward social groups to evaluate group favoritism.  The measure correlating emotion (affect)
to partisanship indicates whether social group favoritism fuels and exacerbates party divisions. By analyzing
trends from 1964 to 2012 in the two polarization measures on five major social group cleavages that have been
the basis of political conflict and party cleavages in the US – race, gender, class, age, and religion, using ANES
public opinion survey data – we can evaluate whether there is a “culture war” in the American public, dividing
major cultural groups into hostile and sharply partisan camps.
Are social groups polarized?
I first analyze polarization of racial groups.  Given the prominent and enduring role of racial issues in American
politics, it would be surprising not to find sharp polarization.  Figure 1 plots the trends in affect (emotions),
calculated as the difference of thermometer scores toward blacks and whites. The two lines represent the mean
scores, ranging from -100 to +100, with positive scores indicating more positive feelings toward people within the
same group and negative feelings toward one’s out-group. The trend clearly shows decreasing, not increasing
polarization, with both blacks and whites becoming more evenly balanced over time in their affect, declining from
25 points for both groups in 1964 to about 10–15 points in the 1980s. Since 1996 racial polarization has been
historically low at 3–14 points.
Figure 1 – Black-White thermometers differenced 1964-2012
Although feelings toward blacks and whites are no longer sharply polarized, racial affect might still exacerbate
party polarization if these feelings increasingly affect party identification. However, as Figure 2 shows, the trend in
the relationship between racial affect and partisanship since 1964 provides little evidence of racial polarization.
The correlation is generally steady among blacks, with a slight increase in 2012 to a still-low 0.18. Among whites,
the correlation indicates a slight shift from Democratic to Republican identification over the half-century, but the
magnitude of the correlations is small (0.11 in 2012).  By contrast, correlations between an ideological polarization
thermometer of liberals and conservatives and party identification rose from .33 in 1972 to .59 in 2004.  Clearly
blacks’ and whites’ favoritism toward their own groups is moderate, and what favoritism exists is only weakly
related to the groups’ partisanship.
Figure 2 – Correlation between White-Black thermometer and party identification
Assessing polarization by class, gender, and age is more difficult due to gaps in the ANES data.  Nonetheless, all
three cleavages follow a similar pattern of low-to-no polarization.   For example, in Figure 3 both working-class
and middle-class respondents have very positive feelings toward the middle class for those years in which there
is data, 1972-1984 and 2004-2012 (and similar feelings toward the working class in years in which there is data). 
This data also shows correlations below .10 over the 40 years, even during the recent controversies over income
stagnation and inequality.
Figure 3 – Middle class thermometer 1972–1984, 2004-2012
For age, the story is similar.  As Figure 4 shows, both young and old feel warmly toward the elderly (and toward
young people when the question was asked).  The correlation of affect and partisanship ranges from -.02 to -.16,
indicating that warmth toward the elderly is linked to democratic identification. Polarization by either measure has
not increased.
Figure 4 – Elderly/Older people feeling thermometer 1976-1988, 1996-2004
Gender differences in feelings toward women follow the same pattern: positive affect among both groups and no
strong link to partisanship.   Thus, among the four cleavages of race, class, age, and gender, there is no strong or
recent polarization in terms of group affect and partisan identification.
Figure 5 – Women feeling thermometer 1976, 1984-1988 and 2004
Religion presents a more complicated story, in part because measuring religious affiliation is multifaceted, and
partly because the ANES changed its religious affiliation measures several times from 1964-2012.  The 2008 and
2012 measures are especially problematic, and no definitive conclusions can be drawn about those years.
With this caveat, the data show both Protestants and Catholics, the two largest religious affiliations in the U.S,
expressing positive affect toward Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Fundamentalist Christians (although Catholics
rate Fundamentalists only around 50 degrees).  Correlations between favorability and partisanship are low,
ranging from -.10 to +.10.  The lone exception is the correlation between affect toward Fundamentalist Christians
and partisanship, shown in Figure 6, which rose above .10 in 2004 and 2008 – but this was only among
Protestants, and the correlation dropped again in 2012.
Figure 6 – Correlation between Christian Fundamentalists thermometer and party identification, 1998-
2012
Separating Evangelical from Mainline Protestants is done inconsistently in the ANES, so we can draw few
conclusions about their views.   However, they appear to be similar, although in 2004 Mainline Protestants more
strongly linked positive affect toward Evangelicals with Republican party identification (r=.028).
At first glance these results appear to contradict an emerging scholarly consensus that Americans’ ideological and
issue positions are becoming “sorted” into increasingly rigid party groups, and that issues tapping “ cultural” values
such as traditionalism are playing a greater role in voting.
In fact, my findings both complement prior research and serve as a corrective to fears of a culture war and
polarization.  The apparent contradiction in results is due to the way culture is defined:  in terms of values and
issue positions in previous research and in terms of the emotions of and toward social groups in my work.  My
analysis reveals that “sorting” at the level of party and voting, has not extended to undermining the social
foundations of politics.  While social groups may strongly differ on issues, including value-laden issues such as
same-sex marriage, group  differences remain at the level of policy and do not extend to direct animosity and the
injection of animosity into the party system, which might exacerbate the likelihood of  a culture war. Though
partisan leaders in Congress, campaigns, interest groups, and media may issue calls to arms to “culture warriors,”
the mass public has not adopted the role of troops taking up arms against one another.
This article is based on the paper “Reframing Polarization: Social Groups and “Culture Wars”, in Political Science
and Politics.
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